Graduation

With Tom's upcoming graduation party in mind, I wanted to make sure that Tom and any others who are graduating (or when we all graduate) know that we still want participation in the Socratic Club Blog after graduation. What a way to stay connected and continue to challenge and sharpen one another for God's kingdom. So Tom, don't drop out.

A Permit to Beg

Coming home from Efland, I drove up the exit onto Alston and a man was sitting there with a sign that said, "Homeless. Hungry." I had just come home from a funeral and was looking forward to getting back home and relaxing a bit, but the Holy Spirit got to me, and I was unable to ignore this man. So I went home, packed a lunch and went back out. I sat down next to Allen and gave him the lunch bag. I sat there as we talked for about five minutes or so. As we were talking a policeman came up the ramp, put his lights on, and stopped at us. He said, "You all have to leave. You have to have a permit to beg. Or else I will have to fine you." I stayed quiet while Allen began an argument with the police officer. I'm not sure Allen was telling the truth, but by the end of the argument he was claiming to have a permit. The policeman didn't request it but told us to leave. After he left, Allen said he was leaving so he didn't get arrested. I'm not sure we were ever threatened with arrest (I don't remember everything the policeman said), but I got up an left as well. So here's my question: should "begging" require a permit? I'm inclined to say "no", and its probably the closest moment I've had to being willing to "risk arrest" to challenge the issue. But I'm not sure. What do others think?

Reflection Paper on the Middle East Travel Seminar

I have just posted my reflection paper for three weeks in the Middle East. I think it is relevant to Socratic Club discussions. I invite you to check out the blog and engage me in conversation there.
Peace and grace,
Tom
www.adventuresoftom.blogspot.com

On Owning our Words.

Recent events in the life of this blog have led me to consider the ethics of anonymity. Specifically the ethics of anonymous theology. Can or should Christians claim anonymity, to any degree, in the production of theology?

I come at this question of anonymity through the question of suffering. As Yoder is want to point out, the concrete way in which we are called to follow Christ is to follow him to the Cross. Thus, as Christians we are called first and foremost to willfully suffer. As such, our work as theologians, ethicists and pastors is to willingly and joyfully follow Christ to the cross in our theology, ethics and pastoral work. The cross is therefore, if nothing else, a call to vocationally suffer along with Christ. DWL's recent post on suffering illustrates, in part, how this call to suffer plays out. What it fails to do, however, is connect our actions in theology with the potential for suffering. This is not necessarily what DWL intended, or set out to do. It is, however, critically important to connect our work in theology, et. all, to the potential for suffering as described by DWL's typology. Surely there is potential not only for subjective and intersubjective suffering, but also for redemptive (1&2) and liberative suffering in our work.

While DWL is quick to point out that his recent typology of suffering is descriptive not prescriptive, there is a sense in which any descriptive typology of inevitable events --in order to be complete-- must also be, at least tacitly, prescriptive. In other words, given the inevitability of suffering within the human condition, any typology that strives to be remotely complete must shoulder not only the responsibility of describing past suffering, but also the burden that comes with the knowledge that any description of suffering will also be used to judge and sort future suffering.

With our call to joyfully suffer vouchsafed in the cross, and the descriptive-cum-prescriptive typology of suffering established by DWL, the question of anonymity with regards to theology can be addressed from it's ability to enable or hinder the potential for suffering. In as much as our anonymity hides our identity from those who may persecute us for our proclamation of the gospel, our anonymity prevents our willful suffering, our willful following of Christ to the cross, and inhibits, if not outright prevents the redemption of suffering. Because of this, as Christians, we must own our words and ideas --even our blog posts-- by name so as to not willfully avoid the suffering we claim to embrace with every bite of the bread and sip of the wine. Our recourse to anonymity, be that for reasons of fear of reprisal or general concern for the future, is therefore a recourse against the call of Christ to suffer. Because of this, can we post here under the anonymity of our initials or nicknames and not turn away from that which we are called? If we wish to carry on theological conversation in the public sphere --for that is where a blog resides-- can we do so ethically without owning our words?

Technorati Tags: Ethics, Suffering, Theology

The King is Dead, Long Live the King!

After reading two books of modern theology which make unsubstantiated passing generalizations like they are pork for southern cooking, I felt I needed to slightly expand my grosse generalization about the coherence of constantinianism within a monarchy.

Now much of this statement is pure reactionary response to the anti-liberal-democratic rhetoric espoused by liberal democrats I know. I mean, what is an anarchist who pays taxes? A liberal.

The gestation for this thought came last year after reading Avery Cardinal Dulles' memoir where he spoke of a teacher he had at Harvard in the thirties who, upon being asked what he would do with a million dollars, immediately responded, "Give the money to Franco to buy tanks." This blew my liberal mind and opened up a new horizon, "what if the socialists in Spain weren't the righteous ones orwell and hemingway paint them out to be?"

I don't have a quick answer to that, the question opened up the possibility that there is a place for fascism, which is the heir of the Louis quatorzien absolute monarchy, and so with that brief preface, my briefer argument begins (like people from Michigan) in earnest.

Constantinianism is a pejorative epithet for a Christian state. The Christian state lasted (explicitly) for over a thousand years; longer than the Roman state it sprang from. There is a valid argument for the counter narrative of such works as the Martyr's Mirror, but there is also the issue which Christian's find within new readings of history of trying to move the date of the fall and challenge the power of the holy spirit. Now, my reactionary readings also have a difficult challenge of baptizing history and oppression, but I shall let someone else make that argument.

The coherence of constantinianism within a fascist or monarchist government is due to the fact that fascism and monarchy are based on communities. A fascist, even (to go a head and throw the bomb) hitler received his power from a community of people supporting him and a community Goebbels was able to continually deceive. Democracy (or the governments we have now, whatever they might better be called) are about pods, compartments, platforms, issues, topics, interests, profits, capital in the most pejorative sense. No matter how much it tries, from the time of Washington's farewell address, we have known that he virtue of democracy is in the ability of the individual to stand against factionalism. Now, whether this has happened much is a broader question, but America was founded on the optimism that we can be magnanimous. Washington did not become king of America because he believed in the possibility of humanity. This is why constantinianism fails in a democracy for it is rightfully cynical about humanity while democracy is the most optimistic. Democracy's feel like we can make choices, constantinianism says that the choice has been made by God, and for good or ill, it will be followed.

Oh, and Bush is not a fascist, he is a democrat of the worst stripe. He is a public deist (at least the language of his speeches) who thinks that the Christian God Billy Graham showed him has put him where he is, but he will soon be gone. Fascists aren't elected by less than a 98% majority, kings by 99%.

There are a lot of holes here, but push it. I am curious to see what will hold up and what will fall away. It is mostly provocation, but like the great provocation artist we have at Duke, it is not about tight theology put pushing us to faithfulness.

A Practical Question

Brothers, sisters:

If the preacher during a Methodist worship service manages to squeeze two trinitarian heresies into one sermon, what should someone sitting in the pew do? What is her responsibility as a disciple in that situation?

Take another situation. Say a preacher has proclaimed overt, nasty racism, sexism, something like that. I have to think that if I were sitting in the pew, and the pastor did something like that, I wouldn't be able to just sit there. I'd have to do something. Right?

Or, say the pastor gets up there and starts talking about how all religions are really just various expressions of one underlying faith in the divine being. Now, granted, this is a UMC congregation, not a TEC. You guys don't believe that stuff, you're Christians. So, I'd have to do something, right?

So, what if the pastor--in the same sermon!--says that God has three parts (tri-theism), and that the one God has expressed himself in three ways (modalism), all in the same sermon? Does the pew-sitter who recognizes the problem have a responsibility to do something about it?

Now, I'll lay my cards on the table. Yes, this just happened last Sunday, "Trinity Sunday." No, I didn't make a scene; I did try to correct his heresies, however, during Sunday School. But here's the thing: why is it that--I'm guessing here, and I know that's dangerous--why is it that most of us probably agree that something needs to be done in the first situation, less so in the second, and even less in the third? Does that worry anyone besides me?

Apparently St. Nicholas punched Arius in the face at Nicaea after the heresiarch had declared that there was once when the Son was not; he later apologized, and now... he's a saint! So... maybe...

Though it might be crass self-promotion,

If you wanted evidence that a fellow socratic went through with his marriage, check out my web log.

(Radical) Evil & (Redemptive) Suffering?

This is a tale of two contentious and contestable concepts: radical evil and redemptive suffering. I've gone a few rounds on these internally, and I just wrote a paper for Coles that addressed some of what I want to shop around here. So while this is not quite off the cuff, needless to say this is all DRAFT/BETA quality. While these may seem to be very different concepts, both concern the meaning of pain and suffering. My basic argument is that the usual deployments of these concepts are counterproductive, and that use of the former ought to be abandoned altogether and the latter largely limited. To make this case, I'll define the concepts, problematize them, and then suggest a constructive gesture.


First, radical evil. The concept, of course, originates with Kant (see Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone). It is the necessary subjective precondition of freedom and autonomy. In order for humans to be free in the terms Kant sets out, one must not only be free not to do the good - or to do less than the good (i.e. the traditional Christian privative view of evil), one must also be free to choose evil in itself as one's "maxim. That is, one must be able to assert evil as one's guiding principle and stated objective. In subsequent literture and contemporary discourse, this takes on a slightly different inflection; especially in the aftermath of Auschwitz whose scale (both scope and severity) has been deemed qualitatively unique and historically singular. For the sake of present discussion, this latter definiton is in view. Namely, radical evil is the doing of evil as an end in itself (i.e. not in service of some greater good, or in aversion of some greater evil) and the inflicting of suffering for its own sake (i.e. sadism).

Thus, radical evil is that which must be avoided at all cost, hence the twin-dictum of the Shoa: "Never forget; never again." While these are indeed worthy aims, they are profoundly problematic. First, as Badiou and Milbank (among others) observe, this gives evil the logical, ethical, and ontological priority. This inverts the traditional Christian account of evil as privative. That is, the Good now becomes the absence of evil; the right to non-suffering. Second, and I think more importantly, radical evil transposes the sources/causes of evil into a suprahuman and transcendental register which actually debilitates resistance to the very evil that is to be avoided at all costs. Because of the horror of "modern extreme evil" (Milbank), any mundane or ordinary explanation is deemed both inadequate and obscene. Rather than being seen as the result of a "political sequence (Badiou), the Shoah remains ineluctable. And thus, irresistible. Thus, radical evil serves to distract from the mendacity of the mundane, or as Arendt puts it, "the banality of evil"; the ways in which even radical evil is/must be seen as (the consequence of) our action. (Think of the rhetoric of "the axis of evil," "operation infinite justice," "operation enduring freedom," etc.)


Now redemptive suffering. This strikes me as a concept so often invoked as to be meaningless. Everything from a migraine to MLK is described as redemptive suffering. The basic sense seems to be whatever suffering is under discussion is somehow meaningful beyond itself in such a way as to be justified by a greater good. Though not explicitly stated, this seems related to what is usually termed the "eschatological" view of theodicy and a correlative commitment to insisting this is "the best of all possible worlds." This too is problematic on a number of counts: 1) It implicitly (if not explicitly) suggests God (in)directly causes/allows suffering for the purposes of moral pedagogy; 2) This also makes the suffering itself intrinsic/necessary, rather than an accident/consequence of sin and the fall; 3) Such loose usage doesn't seem to comport with the biblical witness concerning "taking up one's cross" and having a "koinonia in Christ's suffering."

This being said, I suggest a typology based on the criteria of: 1) intrinsic/extrinsic relation between suffering and redemption; 2) causal/chronological relation between suffering and redemption; 3) self-consciousness of the suffer; and, 4) historial and/or eschatological horizon of meaning. This, I think, works out as follows:



Type | In/Ex-trinsic | Causal/Chronological | Consciousness | Horizon of Meaning

Subjective | Extrinsic | Accidental/Posterior | N/A | Personal

Intersubjective | Instrinsic | Intentional/Prior | Self-Conscious | (Inter)Personal/Eschatological

Redemptive 1 | Intrinsic | Intentional/Prior | Self-Conscious | Proclamational/Eschatological

Redemptive 2 | Intrinsic | Intentional/Prior | Unwitting/Anonymous | Eschatological

Liberative | Intrinsic | Intentional/Prior | Unwitting/Anonymous | Historical


Now inasmuch as this chart/typology is not self-interpreting, let me offer examples that can flesh this out:

SUBJECTIVE suffering is that which is usually called "natural evil." That is, the evil, pain, and suffering endemic to the human condition after the fall; for instance, cancer. While God might act redemptively in such circumstances, this action is extrinsic to the suffering itself (i.e. God's working need not be predicated on suffering). It is after and accidentally related to the circustances of suffering. The suffering is not self-consciously undertaken. And its horizon of meaning is limited to the personal.

INTERSUBJECTIVE suffering is mundane suffering undertaken out of love for neighbor. It is undertaken self-consiously/intentionally and the redemptive element is intrinsic to the suffering itself. Its meaning is personal, interpersonal, and eschatological in that it has the quality of witness. E.g. bone marrow donor.

REDEMPTIVE 1 is the traditional/biblical notion of suffering for the sake of Christ, the gospel, the kingdom. This is suffering occassioned by speech or action that is explicitly and intentionally witness. This would be persecution in the traditional sense, and also actions of civil disobedience aiming at social justice. E.g. traditional martyrdom, or Civil Rights demonstrators.

REDEMPTIVE 2 (and this is one that I wonder about) is a suffering occasioned by confrontation with the powers and principalities, without being undertaken on confessional grounds - explicit or implicit. That is speech and actions which inherently bear witness to the kingdom, and/or stand agains the powers and thus are taken up into the horizion of eschatological significance.

LIBERATIVE suffering is what might be considered "secular" redemptive suffering. That is suffering untertaken intentionally and self-consciously in the interest of a cause. This is the same as redemptive suffering (1), but limited to the horizon of history and may. or may not have eschatological significance.


In summary, redemptive suffering (in the technical/scriptural sense) is that which is undertaken self-consciously and intentionally on behalf of others as a means of witness (perhaps even unwittingly), it is intrinsically and necessarily related to the Immediate (personal, interpersonal, historical) and ultimate (eschatological) redemption achieved in/through it, and has eschatological significance beyond the individual.