Cur Deus Homo: Badiou Redux (aka - my random thoughts from the OBGYN waiting room)
Socratics (et al): Among the many things I've read this summer was Hallward's excellent treatment of Badiou. I've also spent a lot of time polishing and reworking my Campell essay in which Badiou plays a significant part. Thus, Alain and his notion of Event, Subject, and Truth have been rattling around my head all summer. And, as he and Campbell are frequently invoked in our discussions and posts, I thought I'd post this (semi)random reflection about he and Anselm, with a cameo by J Denny Weaver. It is literally a transcription of some journal paragraphs I made in the waiting room of our OBGYN this past week. (If you somehow have not yet heard, we're expecting our first child this fall.) It's not so much an argument, as a rumination about how Badiou might allow us to retool Anselm in such a way as to better achieve what Weaver unsuccessfully attempts in Nonviolent Atonement.
Cur Deus Homo: Badiou Redux
"None but man should satisfy God's justice, but none but God can satisfy man's debt" - Anslem
"That which he did not assume, he did not redeem" - Naziansus
"God became man, that man might become God" - Athanasius
Badiou contends that the crucifixion/death are not constitutive of redemption. "Death as such counts for nothing in the operation of salvation...Resurrection alone is a given of the event which mobilizes the site whose operation is salvation...For death is an operation in the situation, an operation that immanentizes the evental site, while resurrection is the event as such" (70). Death and the crucifixion belong to the configuration (state) of this present age - the flesh. Resurrection is the irruption (event) of the age to come - the spirit. Though the rhetoric is perhaps overstated, the logic seems right. It is, perhaps, a better articulation of what J. Denny Weaver attempts in Nonviolent Atonement. How does this map onto Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? First there is the Chalcedonian insistance, "That which he did not assume, he did not redeem." And second there is Anselm's own formulation of man's obligation and God's ability. Though the penal (and/or economic) inflection is incompatible with Badiou. The "should" and "can" cannot be construed as debt and payment. That is, contra Anselm, redemption cannot be achieved via a satisfaction reducible to death/crucifixion.
What then? First, in order for redemption to be real, for a truly new subjective path to be opened, Christ must be fully human. If his obedience and resurrection are purely and solely predicated on his divinity, they are unrepeatable and thus unavailable. But this does not merely reduce to a reiteration of the subsequent Abelardian "moral exemplar" paradigm. Christ is not just an example to be followed via imitatio; he is the prototype and paradigm of participatio. This is the real, ontological, subjective import of being the second Adam.
This leaves the second clause of the modified Anselmian dictum; "only God can." And here the moves become more challenging. Two things are necessary. First, one must specify why the above subjective path and participatio not only are not, but further cannot be made available otherwise. And second, one must specify how the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection make these available, without adverting to a substitutionary-satisfaction schema. What, then, are the possibilities for nonviolent redemption (even Weaver's choice of "atonement" betrays his point)?
The first collapses back into the "man must" clause. Only by actually being human is participatio (and thereby imitatio) possible. This is problematic for two reasons. First it is open to an adoptionist schema. God could adopt and divinize a human, and subsequently do the same with every other human. Second, there is no way to justify this other than as a dogmatic claim. And I do not mean dogmatic in the Barthian sense of "on grounds internal to the Church, her Scriptures, and her Tradition. Absent the substitutionary-satisfaction motif, this claim is itself specifically dogmatic, within the Barthian generic sense of dogmatic. Or as Badiou would prefer it if he were a theologian, this can only be declared axiomatically. But this would leave the substance and rationale of the "only God can" clause ill-defined.
A second possibility is to argue on narratological grounds. This is, in nuce, Weaver's line. The focal text here would be the Parable of the Vineyard (Matthew 21, Mark 12, Luke 20, Thomas 65-66). The can and must relate as an narrative imperative of divine self-disclosure as the longsuffering, forebearing, and forgiving God whose own self-son is sacrificed before an ultimate retributive intervention. God must do so in order to sufficiently reveal the peaceful and reconciliatory character of the Trinity's immanent life and redemptive movement toward humanity. While compelling on narratological grounds, this does nothing to clarify why participatio is necessarily unavailable otherwise, or how it is available subsequently. Thus it collapses into the previous dogmatic-axiomatic declaration, albeit as an amplification. And/or it amounts to a theological iteration of the exemplar model, except that in this case the exemplification is of God's own self, rather than a moral ideal.
Thus it seems we must seek another option, something approaching the Christus Victor paradigm, but with ontological and ethical import for human subjects. On this paradigm, the necessity is full and absolute submission to the powers - obedience even unto death on the cross, and then their overcoming. "Only God can" overcome and make a show of the powers via resurrection. Only God can take their ultimate dominion and turn it into their ultimate destruction. Thus the specific necessity of death is not payment (juridical or economic), but instead is the demonstration that worldly/imperial power/violence in extremis - the state-sanctioned torture and lynching of the Holy One are ultimately powerless. To be clear, this necessity is a negative one; death and crucifixion demonstrate the impotence of worldly power/redemption. Resurrection, the correlative positive necessity make possible redemption (cf. Sarah Coakley Powers & Submissions).
Still this is insufficient. While this retains the necessity of incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection for redemption and avoids the substitiutonary-satisfaction misstep, "the only God can" remains somewhat elusive. For this still does not definitively exclude adoptionism. To rephrase this as a question, Why must the second person of the Trinity, as preexisitent logos rather than adopted human, be the one to submit to, and suffer at the hands of the powers in order to defeat them by resurrection?
Again, what options, possibilities, and avenues are available? It seems that the Ascension must somehow figure into the discussion. But again, how is the ascension of an adopted human to be precluded (as it must)? Perhaps the descent-ascent is required for participatio in that humanity must be assumed by/into the divine life of the Trinity. Still though this narrows the adoptionist avenue, it does not definitively exclude it. Somehow resurrection must exclusively be the possibility of divine being. Yet this must also, subsequently, be(come) a possibility for human beings. And if this is the case, are we not then compelled to take an Orthodox position concerning theosis?
And again, is there any means of making such assertions other than on (specifically) dogmatic grounds? It seems that the necessarily peaceful and nonviolent nature of the Trinity (and thus the cosmos) require that the person who submits and suffers at the hands of the powers in order to defeat and to make a show of them via resurrection not only must be God's own self, but must always have been God's own self. That is, an adopted second person would amount to a coercively conscripted second person, and thus not fully escape the paradigm of redemptive violence.
This seems to be an adequate "Badiouan" rearticulation of the Anselmian dictum (man must, but only God can) that escapes the taint of redemptive violence implicit in substitutionary-satisfaction paradigms of atonement. And it precludes any recourse to adoptionism. It also gives a correlative account of both participatio and imitatio compatible with Badiou's formal account of Event, Truth, and Subject. And while the relationship between participatio and imitatio remains generically dogmatic (Barthian sense), the additional specific sense is removed.
Cur Deus Homo: Badiou Redux
"None but man should satisfy God's justice, but none but God can satisfy man's debt" - Anslem
"That which he did not assume, he did not redeem" - Naziansus
"God became man, that man might become God" - Athanasius
Badiou contends that the crucifixion/death are not constitutive of redemption. "Death as such counts for nothing in the operation of salvation...Resurrection alone is a given of the event which mobilizes the site whose operation is salvation...For death is an operation in the situation, an operation that immanentizes the evental site, while resurrection is the event as such" (70). Death and the crucifixion belong to the configuration (state) of this present age - the flesh. Resurrection is the irruption (event) of the age to come - the spirit. Though the rhetoric is perhaps overstated, the logic seems right. It is, perhaps, a better articulation of what J. Denny Weaver attempts in Nonviolent Atonement. How does this map onto Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? First there is the Chalcedonian insistance, "That which he did not assume, he did not redeem." And second there is Anselm's own formulation of man's obligation and God's ability. Though the penal (and/or economic) inflection is incompatible with Badiou. The "should" and "can" cannot be construed as debt and payment. That is, contra Anselm, redemption cannot be achieved via a satisfaction reducible to death/crucifixion.
What then? First, in order for redemption to be real, for a truly new subjective path to be opened, Christ must be fully human. If his obedience and resurrection are purely and solely predicated on his divinity, they are unrepeatable and thus unavailable. But this does not merely reduce to a reiteration of the subsequent Abelardian "moral exemplar" paradigm. Christ is not just an example to be followed via imitatio; he is the prototype and paradigm of participatio. This is the real, ontological, subjective import of being the second Adam.
This leaves the second clause of the modified Anselmian dictum; "only God can." And here the moves become more challenging. Two things are necessary. First, one must specify why the above subjective path and participatio not only are not, but further cannot be made available otherwise. And second, one must specify how the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection make these available, without adverting to a substitutionary-satisfaction schema. What, then, are the possibilities for nonviolent redemption (even Weaver's choice of "atonement" betrays his point)?
The first collapses back into the "man must" clause. Only by actually being human is participatio (and thereby imitatio) possible. This is problematic for two reasons. First it is open to an adoptionist schema. God could adopt and divinize a human, and subsequently do the same with every other human. Second, there is no way to justify this other than as a dogmatic claim. And I do not mean dogmatic in the Barthian sense of "on grounds internal to the Church, her Scriptures, and her Tradition. Absent the substitutionary-satisfaction motif, this claim is itself specifically dogmatic, within the Barthian generic sense of dogmatic. Or as Badiou would prefer it if he were a theologian, this can only be declared axiomatically. But this would leave the substance and rationale of the "only God can" clause ill-defined.
A second possibility is to argue on narratological grounds. This is, in nuce, Weaver's line. The focal text here would be the Parable of the Vineyard (Matthew 21, Mark 12, Luke 20, Thomas 65-66). The can and must relate as an narrative imperative of divine self-disclosure as the longsuffering, forebearing, and forgiving God whose own self-son is sacrificed before an ultimate retributive intervention. God must do so in order to sufficiently reveal the peaceful and reconciliatory character of the Trinity's immanent life and redemptive movement toward humanity. While compelling on narratological grounds, this does nothing to clarify why participatio is necessarily unavailable otherwise, or how it is available subsequently. Thus it collapses into the previous dogmatic-axiomatic declaration, albeit as an amplification. And/or it amounts to a theological iteration of the exemplar model, except that in this case the exemplification is of God's own self, rather than a moral ideal.
Thus it seems we must seek another option, something approaching the Christus Victor paradigm, but with ontological and ethical import for human subjects. On this paradigm, the necessity is full and absolute submission to the powers - obedience even unto death on the cross, and then their overcoming. "Only God can" overcome and make a show of the powers via resurrection. Only God can take their ultimate dominion and turn it into their ultimate destruction. Thus the specific necessity of death is not payment (juridical or economic), but instead is the demonstration that worldly/imperial power/violence in extremis - the state-sanctioned torture and lynching of the Holy One are ultimately powerless. To be clear, this necessity is a negative one; death and crucifixion demonstrate the impotence of worldly power/redemption. Resurrection, the correlative positive necessity make possible redemption (cf. Sarah Coakley Powers & Submissions).
Still this is insufficient. While this retains the necessity of incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection for redemption and avoids the substitiutonary-satisfaction misstep, "the only God can" remains somewhat elusive. For this still does not definitively exclude adoptionism. To rephrase this as a question, Why must the second person of the Trinity, as preexisitent logos rather than adopted human, be the one to submit to, and suffer at the hands of the powers in order to defeat them by resurrection?
Again, what options, possibilities, and avenues are available? It seems that the Ascension must somehow figure into the discussion. But again, how is the ascension of an adopted human to be precluded (as it must)? Perhaps the descent-ascent is required for participatio in that humanity must be assumed by/into the divine life of the Trinity. Still though this narrows the adoptionist avenue, it does not definitively exclude it. Somehow resurrection must exclusively be the possibility of divine being. Yet this must also, subsequently, be(come) a possibility for human beings. And if this is the case, are we not then compelled to take an Orthodox position concerning theosis?
And again, is there any means of making such assertions other than on (specifically) dogmatic grounds? It seems that the necessarily peaceful and nonviolent nature of the Trinity (and thus the cosmos) require that the person who submits and suffers at the hands of the powers in order to defeat and to make a show of them via resurrection not only must be God's own self, but must always have been God's own self. That is, an adopted second person would amount to a coercively conscripted second person, and thus not fully escape the paradigm of redemptive violence.
This seems to be an adequate "Badiouan" rearticulation of the Anselmian dictum (man must, but only God can) that escapes the taint of redemptive violence implicit in substitutionary-satisfaction paradigms of atonement. And it precludes any recourse to adoptionism. It also gives a correlative account of both participatio and imitatio compatible with Badiou's formal account of Event, Truth, and Subject. And while the relationship between participatio and imitatio remains generically dogmatic (Barthian sense), the additional specific sense is removed.
posted by DWL at 4:22 PM
1 Comments:
I really just want to push you on "Death and the crucifixion belong to the configuration (state) of this present age - the flesh." I think there is an interruption here and it precisely the one that makes Badiou see the resurrection as a fable. The resurrection will always be a fable if you do not see the Passion as not just descriptive but essential, in some set of all sets manner. I am not pressing for some payment, some satisfaction-substation, but extra gratium Hebrews and the end of the sacrifices. There is no further need for sacrifice because the Cross is the sacrifice which both sums up and destroys all others. The cross is the event which defines the world and brings about the event which defines the New World.
You already said some of this, I just thought that by showing the twoness (Logique des mondes) of the crucifixion-resurrection the incoherence Badiou sees in the person of Jesus Christ may be more apparent.
Oh, and congratulations on the immanent and imminent child.
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